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Introduction 
In 1773, the Governor of Virginia voiced his concerns that he was 
“‘forced to authorize the confinement of [persons with mental illness-
es] . . .’ because of lack of appropriate services.”1 Over 200 years later, 
the problem is still with us. In 2011, the guards at Central Prison in 
Raleigh, North Carolina, held David Harold, a mentally ill inmate, nak-
ed in an isolation cell filled with feces and urine and denied him access 
 
1. Ctr. for Mental Health Servs., Building Bridges: Consumers and 
Representatives of the Mental Health and Criminal Justice 
Systems in Dialogue 3 (2005) (alterations in original). 
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to medical or mental health treatment.2 Similarly, in 2012, the staff at 
the Colorado State Penitentiary mistreated another man, a schizo-
phrenic and psychotic inmate convicted of stealing a Buddha statue 
worth $1,000 during a psychotic episode, by denying him access to 
proper mental health treatment.3 This lack of treatment led to the 
Colorado man’s sentence increasing from one to four years for the 
resulting uncontrolled behavior.4 The 1773 Virginia Governor’s con-
cerns and the plight of both men illustrate that the incarceration of and 
inadequate care for people with mental illness in the American criminal 
justice system is an issue that predates even the United States, and the 
same problems—high recidivism rates and over-penalization, to name a 
few—persist today.5 
That state and federal prisons incarcerate nearly two million adults 
with serious mental illness each year, often for terms far exceeding those 
given to non-mentally ill adults who commit similar offenses, com-
pounds these problems.6 Nearly sixteen percent of the total prison pop-
ulation is diagnosed with a severe mental illness, whereas only about 
four percent of men and two percent of women in the general population 
are diagnosed with similar mental illnesses.7 The difficulty of providing 
adequate access to treatment contributes to these disproportionately 
 
2. Amanda Lamb, Father Says Central Prison Mistreated His Mentally Ill Son, 
WRAL (Jan. 4, 2012), http://www.wral.com/news/local/story/10557210/ 
[https://perma.cc/YS98-324J]. 
3. Kathy Brandt, In Prison with Schizophrenia and Psychosis, Kathy Brandt 
Author (Mar. 28, 2013), http://kathybrandtauthor.com/mental-health/in-
prison-with-schizophrenia [https://perma.cc/UQR7-MX9B]. 
4. Id.  
5. See Seth Jacob Prins & Laura Draper, Council of State 
Governments Justice Center, Improving Outcomes for People 
with Mental Illnesses Under Community Corrections Supervision: 
A Guide to Research-Informed Policy and Practice 7 (2009) 
[hereinafter Improving Outcomes] (suggesting that a lack of faith in 
treatment resources, fear, and misconceptions regarding mental illness result 
in disproportionately high delays in release and higher willingness in the 
criminal justice system to force mentally ill offenders to serve the maximum 
sentence allowed). 
6. Allison D. Redlich et al., Is Diversion Swift? Comparing Mental Health 
Court and Traditional Criminal Justice Processing, 39 Crim. Just. & Behav. 
420, 421 (2012) (noting that jail stays are “2.5 to 8 times longer” for mentally 
ill inmates). 
7. Criminal Justice/Mental Health Consensus Project, Mental 
Health Courts: A Primer for Policymakers and Practitioners 
2 (2008) [hereinafter Mental Health Courts Primer]. 
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long prison terms for the mentally ill.8 Further, mentally ill prisoners 
often lack the ability to consistently follow prison rules and orders, 
exposing them to increased discipline.9 These factors, though, are more 
related to mental illness than the actual crimes precipitating incarcer-
ation.10 
In an effort to confront this problem in the late 1990s, states began 
developing diversion opportunities to avoid disproportionate punish-
ment.11 These opportunities came in the form of mental health courts. 
And, by 2013, the mental health court system had expanded to over 
340 mental health courts in forty-three states.12 
While mental health courts have been generally successful in 
reducing participant recidivism, increasing participant access to treat-
ment, improving participant quality of life, and reducing government 
costs,13 some scholars have questioned whether mental health courts’ 
 
8. Position Statement 53: Mental Health Courts, Mental Health America 
(Dec. 6, 2014), http://www.mentalhealthamerica.net/positions/mental-
health-courts [https://perma.cc/8UUG-2MEN]. 
9. Human Rights Watch, Ill-Equipped: U.S. Prisons and Offenders 
with Mental Illness 60 (2003). See also Redlich et al., supra note 6, at 
421 (“[I]nfractions can lead to longer stays because of increased sanctions.”). 
10. See Ken Kress, An Argument for Assisted Outpatient Treatment for Persons 
with Serious Mental Illness Illustrated with Reference to a Proposed Statute 
for Iowa, 85 Iowa L. Rev. 1269, 1272 (2000) (noting that violence and mental 
illness appear connected). 
11. Mental Health Courts Primer, supra note 7, at 1; It is important to 
note that some states attempted, unsuccessfully, to establish Mental Health 
Courts in the 1980s, often considered the heart of the “deinstitutionalization” 
era; however, despite the popular belief that most state psychiatric hospitals 
closed in the 1970s and 1980s, “more . . . closed in the 1990s than in the 
1970s and ’80s combined.” Risdon N. Slate et al., The Criminalization 
of Mental Illness: Crisis and Opportunity for the Justice System 
38–39 n.29 (2d ed. 2013). The increased deinstitutionalization in the 1990s 
likely raised awareness for and heightened the need to address the plight of 
the mentally ill in the criminal justice system, perhaps resulting in the more 
successful establishment of Mental Health Courts during this later period. 
12. Beth Gilbert, The Use and Effectiveness of Mental Health Courts, 
Psychiatry Advisor (Mar. 30, 2015), http://www.psychiatryadvisor.com/ 
practice-management/the-use-and-effectiveness-of-mental-health-courts/ 
article/406221/ [https://perma.cc/NT5X-QVJC]; see Mental Health 
Treatment Court Locators, Substance Abuse and Mental Health 
Servs. Admin., http://www.samhsa.gov/gains-center/mental-health-
treatment-court-locators [https://perma.cc/A5NY-P7JC ] (last updated Aug. 
19, 2015) [hereinafter GAINS Center Database] (compiling self-reported data 
on the various Mental Health Courts across the United States); see generally 
Slate et al., supra note 11, at 379–84 (describing the emergence and 
proliferation of Mental Health Courts). 
13. See infra Part I.A. 
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efficacy has come at too high a cost to participants’ liberty interests.14 
The objective of this Note is to explore one of the espoused safeguards 
to participant liberty: the requirement that participation in mental 
health courts be voluntary. It suggests that, though structural and 
clinical barriers may inhibit voluntariness in mental health court part-
icipation, adopting the consumer-participation model employed in some 
private health treatment settings will improve mental health court 
participants’ capacity for voluntary participation. Further, it suggests 
that the improved voluntarism that the adoption of this model obtains 
will help avoid several of the legal issues that mental health court opp-
onents raise—conflicts with the right to a jury trial, the right to counsel, 
the Americans with Disabilities Act, and the informed consent doctrine. 
For the purposes of this Note it is important to separate the volun-
tariness question from other important, related inquiries like compet-
ence and informed consent for treatment (a related but different inq-
uiry). A competence adjudication is a preliminary (often presumed) 
threshold requirement for all criminal defendants, including mental 
health court participants.15 Generally, the court must determine that a 
defendant “has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with 
a reasonable degree of rational understanding—and . . . a rational as 
well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him.”16 On the 
other hand, the informed consent inquiry, occurs at the point of clinical 
treatment and requires that participants (1) be informed of the benefits, 
risks, and alternatives to treatment; (2) understand those benefits, 
risks, and alternatives; and (3) voluntarily consent to the treatment.17 
 
14. See, e.g., Stacey M. Faraci, Slip Slidin’ Away? Will Our Nation’s Mental 
Health Court Experiment Diminish the Rights of the Mentally Ill?, 22 
Quinnipiac L. Rev. 811, 853 (2004) (arguing that Mental Health Court 
defendants “endure much more liberty restrictions and privacy intrusions” 
and that labeling the “sentence ‘treatment,’ rather than ‘punishment,’” 
allows the Court to exert more coercion over the participant than would 
otherwise be available); Tammy Seltzer, Mental Health Courts: A Misguided 
Attempt to Address the Criminal Justice System’s Unfair Treatment of 
People with Mental Illnesses, 11 Psychol. Pub. Pol’y & L. 570, 574 (2005) 
(arguing that the absence of voluntariness raises concerns regarding 14th 
Amendment equal protection, 6th Amendment rights, and discrimination 
prohibited under the ADA). 
15. See Mental Health Courts Primer, supra note 7, at 5. 
16. Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960); see also Council of State 
Gov’ts, A Guide to Mental Health Court Design and Implement-
ation 43 (2005) [hereinafter Guide to Design and Implementation] 
(noting that this standard may vary across different states). 
17. See Jessica W. Berg et al., Informed Consent: Legal Theory and 
Clinical Practice 65 (2d ed. 2001) (noting that the doctrine of informed 
consent is comprised of “[t]he duty of disclosure, or the duty to in-
form, . . . [and] two other essential features: . . . understanding . . . [and] 
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Though this inquiry may arise several times throughout the mental 
health court process (i.e., when treatment strategies change), its scope 
is relatively narrow—limiting voluntariness to only the point of treat-
ment.18 Unlike competence and informed consent, the voluntariness 
question is not confined to a specific time but continues throughout the 
mental health court process as the defendant makes participation 
choices, such as the decision not to withdraw.19 Further, even when a 
defendant is competent and gives informed consent to treatment, issues 
may still arise as to whether the defendant’s participation is volun-
tary—that is, whether the decision to participate is free of coercion and 
made with the understanding of its consequences.20 
Part I of this Note is a brief overview of the mental health court 
system. It is broken into two subparts: first, a brief description of the 
system’s goals and success; and, second, a brief overview of mental 
health courts’ general structure. The theme here is that the term 
“system” is really a misnomer, and there is plenty of room for develop-
ment. 
In Part II, I introduce some of the barriers to achieving voluntary 
participation. This section also has two subparts: first, a discussion on 
target participants’ reduced capacities; and, second, a description of the 
structural shortcomings in mental health courts. The general the- 
me here is that target participants do not suffer from a depreciated 
decision-making capacity despite not having the tools to control their 
illnesses. Instead, it suggests that participants have a reduced capacity 
for voluntarism that can be improved through increasing education and 
empowerment. 
Finally, in Part III, I discuss the possible adoption of the consumer-
participation model from private mental health treatment as a tool for 
improving access to information and reducing coercion in the mental 
health court process. I suggest that this model will help alleviate some 
of the problems with voluntariness in mental health court programs. 
Further, I suggest that the benefits obtained from adopting the 
consumer-participation model also address many of the concerns that 
mental health court opponents raise. 
 
voluntariness”). “Voluntariness,” here, is an “ill-defined” concept generally 
meaning free of coercion. See id. at 67–70. 
18.  Guide to Design and Implementation, supra note 16, at 45. 
19. See id.; Seltzer, supra note 14, at 575. 
20. See John S. Goldkamp & Cheryl Irons-Guynn, Bureau of Justice 
Assistance, Emerging Judicial Strategies for the Mentally 
Ill in the Criminal Caseload: Mental Health Courts in Fort 
Lauderdale, Seattle, San Bernardino, and Anchorage xi (2000) 
(noting that voluntariness is difficult and important to safeguard and that 
what is perceived as voluntary choices may actually be coerced). 
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I. The Mental Health Court System 
In order to understand the voluntarism discourse discussed in this 
Note, it is necessary to understand the mental health court framework. 
This section begins by discussing the purpose behind the development 
of mental health courts as a tool for improving criminal justice out-
comes for cases involving mentally ill offenders. This section then 
addresses how mental health courts operate. Overall, this section illu-
strates that, while mental health courts appear to be achieving their 
goals, there is significant need for development and standardization of 
their practices—most importantly, improving the level of voluntary 
participation. 
A. The Goals and Successes of Mental Health Courts 
The primary purpose of mental health courts is to provide better 
outcomes for both the community and mentally ill offenders by reducing 
the disproportionate incarceration of mentally ill offenders and connect-
ing them to treatment resources.21 While mental health court practices 
vary widely among jurisdictions,22 the Bureau of Justice Administration 
recognizes four common goals geared toward the realization of this 
primary purpose: 
[1] Increased public safety . . . by . . . lowering the high recidiv-
ism rates for [mentally ill offenders]; 
[2] Increased treatment engagement by participants; 
[3] Improved quality of life for participants; [and] 
[4] More effective use of resources.23 
Mental health court opponents, while recognizing that these goals 
are paramount, believe that mental health courts are not the correct 
avenue toward achieving those goals.24 Instead, they suggest that a 
multitude of different changes in the criminal justice and mental health 
systems would better achieve them.25 Still, mental health courts have 
 
21. See Mental Health Courts Primer, supra note 7, at 3 (stating that 
Mental Health Courts attempt to address the root cause of the behavior). 
22. See infra Part I.B. 
23. Mental Health Courts Primer, supra note 7, at 8. 
24.  See Seltzer, supra note 14, at 583 (stating that mental health courts “are 
not the appropriate front door to access mental health care”). 
25. See id. at 584–86 (detailing fundamental flaws in mental health courts 
that cannot be corrected and suggesting that mental health courts impede 
the real root of the behavior from being addressed). 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 66·Issue 2·2015 
Rehabilitation Through Empowerment 
587 
been, and will likely continue, spreading as they appear to achieve these 
goals. 
Reducing the high recidivism rates among mentally ill offenders is 
the top priority and measure of mental health court success.26 Studies 
have shown that, among those who successfully graduate from mental 
health court programs, recidivism rates and contacts with the criminal 
justice system are significantly lower than the rates participants exper-
ienced before receiving treatment.27 Further, studies have also shown 
that, when compared to mentally ill offenders who went through tradit-
ional processing, those who went through mental health court programs 
had significantly lower recidivism rates.28 Though these studies use an 
imperfect proxy to measure recidivism—post-treatment arrest rates29—
the reduction in arrest rates suggests that mental health courts have 
been relatively successful in achieving the goal of reducing recidivism 
among mentally ill offenders. 
Much like with reducing recidivism rates, connecting mentally ill 
offenders to treatment resources is among mental health courts’ top 
priorities, largely because treatment helps reduce recidivism and results 
in improved clinical outcomes in participants’ functioning.30 Linkage to 
 
26. See Nat’l Ctr. for State Courts, Mental Health Court Per-
formance Measures (2010) [hereinafter NCSC Brochure] (listing in-
program and post-program recidivism as the first and last among fourteen 
measures of mental health court performance).  
27. See, e.g., Henry J. Steadman et al., Effect of Mental Health Courts on 
Arrests and Jail Days: A Multistate Study, 68 Arch. Gen. Psychiatry 
167, 167–68 (2011); Virginia A. Hiday & Bradley Ray, Arrests Two Years 
After Exiting a Well-Established Mental Health Court, 61 Psychiatric 
Servs. 463, 465 (2010) (finding that participants who completed the program 
had lower recidivism rates than their pre-treatment rates sustained for two 
years after ceasing court-mandated treatment and monitoring). 
28. See, e.g., Dale E. McNiel & Renee L. Binder, Effectiveness of a Mental 
Health Court in Reducing Criminal Recidivism and Violence, 164 Am. J. 
Psychiatry 1395, 1401 (2007) (finding that, at eighteen months after 
graduation from mental health courts, the rate of recidivism among 
participants was roughly thirty-nine percent lower than the recidivism rate 
among mentally ill persons in “treatment as usual” settings); Shelli B. 
Rossman et al., Urban Inst., Criminal Justice Interventions for 
Offenders with Mental Illness: Evaluation of Mental Health 
Courts in Bronx and Brooklyn, New York 124 (2012) (finding that 
recidivism rates among participants in the Bronx and Brooklyn mental 
health courts were six to seventeen percentage points lower than recidivism 
rates among nonparticipants in the same jurisdictions). 
29. This measure is imperfect because criminal recidivism may go unreported 
or police may choose not to arrest. But cf. Seltzer, supra note 14, at 573 
(suggesting that police are more likely to arrest a person with mental illness). 
30. See Improving Outcomes, supra note 5, at 22–27 (summarizing the results 
from studies regarding community treatment programs’ effects on mentally ill 
people’s criminal justice and clinical outcomes); see also NCSC Brochure, 
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community treatment is accomplished in three ways: (1) encouragement 
to continue with or return to previous treatment providers already 
familiar with the participant, (2) judicial referrals to providers for the 
staff’s recommended services after participant evaluations, and (3) pro-
viding general information or lists of providers to participants whose 
cases are milder.31 This court-facilitated engagement with treatment 
and court-mandated compliance with the treatment plan serve to im-
prove access to mental health services after program entry.32 They also 
increase treatment utilization in both incidence and volume for partici-
pants as compared to treatment utilization rates for mentally ill offend-
ers in traditional processing.33 Despite this general success, opponents 
are quick to point out that mental health courts are hindered, especially 
in rural areas, because they rely on already available, finite community 
treatment resources rather than creating new resources.34 Still, the str-
ain caused when access to finite community-based mental health treat-
ment resources seems preferable to the alternative: effectively cordoning 
off treatment from people whose offense history illustrates their need 
for it. Further, where community-based treatment is available, mental 
health courts appear to have been successful in connecting participants 
to it. 
The last two goals’ accomplishment is part and parcel to that of 
the first two: where recidivism is decreased and access to treatment is 
increased, it follows that governmental and societal costs will go down 
and quality of life for mental health court participants will increase. 
Consistent with this concept and the studies reflecting decreased recidi-
vism, studies have also shown that mental health court programs have 
resulted in modest annual savings, mostly due to lower incarceration 
 
supra note 26 (using participants’ connection to and participation in treatment 
as two of the fourteen performance measures in mental health courts). 
31. Roger A. Boothroyd et al., The Broward Mental Health Court: Process, 
Outcomes, and Service Utilization, 26 Int’l J.L. & Psychiatry 55, 59 (2003). 
32. See Karli J. Keator et al., The Impact of Treatment on the Public Safety 
Outcomes of Mental Health Court Participants, 57 Am. Behav. Scientist 
231, 232 (2013) (stating that Mental Health Courts “generally increase 
participants’ access and utilization of community treatment”). 
33. See Boothroyd et al., supra note 31, at 63–67 (analyzing data collected from 
two groups of individuals for an eight-month period following an appearance 
in a mental health court). 
34. Slate et al., supra note 11, at 402. It is also problematic that increased 
utilization of finite mental health treatment services results in “rationing 
[that] may delay or even prevent intervention for . . . persons who are in need 
of mental health services” but are not participants due to lack of illegal 
activity. Id. at 404. A danger, here, is that non-offenders with restricted access 
to treatment may suffer adverse outcomes and an increased propensity toward 
criminal behavior—the very thing mental health courts are trying to combat. 
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costs and larger governmental savings for both incarceration and treat-
ment services over an extended period.35 Further, studies also suggest 
that, in step with increased treatment access, mental health court 
participants have an improved quality of life through improved funct-
ioning,36 fewer bookings and jail days,37 and greater perceived fairness 
and respect for the criminal justice system.38 These decreased incarcer-
ation and treatment costs coupled with the improved functionality and 
quality of life that mental health court participants experience suggest 
that these programs are capable of meeting their goals to more efficient-
ly use resources while also achieving higher-quality outcomes for ment-
ally ill offenders. 
Though these studies are limited by their narrow scope and the 
difficulty in collecting data across a multitude of jurisdictions with div-
erse programs,39 their findings suggest that mental health courts are 
capable of providing better outcomes. These improved outcomes reduce 
the over-representation of the mentally ill in the criminal justice system 
and increasing access to treatment resources—benefiting both mentally 
ill offenders and the community at large.40 The next section will intro-
duce the general structure and operation of mental health courts. 
 
35. M. Susan Ridgely et al., Rand Corp., Justice, Treatment, and 
Cost: An Evaluation of the Fiscal Impact of Allegheny County 
Mental Health Court 20 (2007) (finding that participants with more 
severe cases of mental illness, low functioning, and criminal activity yielded 
higher savings, though these savings were statistically “[in]significant in the 
first year”). But cf. Rossman et al., supra note 28, at 127 (finding it 
“prohibitively difficult to estimate the costs of regular MHC operations and 
impossible to estimate the social costs of sanctions and treatment,” but 
suggesting a model for future analysis). 
36. See, e.g., Merith Cosden et al., Evaluation of a Mental Health Treatment 
Court with Assertive Community Treatment, 21 Behav. Sci. & L. 415, 424 
(2003) (noting that mental health court patients “demonstrated improve-
ments in life satisfaction, psychological distress, independent functioning, and 
drug problems”). 
37. See, e.g., Steadman et al., supra note 27, at 170–72. 
38. See, e.g., Boothroyd, supra note 31, at 68 (finding that procedural fairness 
increases while participants’ perceptions of coercion decrease). This perception 
of fairness has important implications for mental health court effectiveness 
because “when participants . . . view the mental health court process as 
procedurally fair, they are more likely to be cooperative.” Slate et al., 
supra note 11, at 401. 
39. See Mental Health Courts Primer, supra note 7, at 14 (noting that 
mental health court studies tend to focus on individual programs or juris-
dictional areas). 
40. Id. at 8.  
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B. Mental Health Court Structure and Operation 
Though mental health courts are rapidly proliferating and have 
enjoyed some success in their mission, they lack a standardized definit-
ion, largely due to their general status as “experimental” and due to 
local differences in needs and resources.41 Still, the Bureau for Justice 
Administration has pieced together the various commonalities among 
mental health courts to create a generalized working definition: 
[A] specialized court docket for . . . defendants with mental 
illnesses . . . identified through mental health screening and 
assessments and voluntarily participat[ing] in a judicially super-
vised treatment plan . . . [with i]ncentives reward[ing] adher-
ence . . . and success . . . defined according to predetermined 
criteria.42 
This definition, in itself, illustrates several areas where ambiguity 
exists regarding mental health court practices. This section discusses a 
generalized picture of mental health court process, though some proced-
ural and substantive inconsistencies exist across jurisdictions. 
The mental health court process begins with a referral, which may 
come from a multitude of sources: arresting officers, booking officers, 
jail staff, prosecutors, defense attorneys, judges, and even the defen-
dant.43 At this stage, the referrer evaluates the offender for a number 
of criteria—namely the criminal charge and a severe mental illness diag-
nosis.44 There is no uniform charge criterion across all mental health  
41. But see Gregory L. Acquaviva, Comment, Mental Health Courts: No Longer 
Experimental, 36 Seton Hall L. Rev. 971, 993–95 (2006) (recognizing the 
“pilot model” status as the reason mental health courts still face problems). 
See also Slate et al., supra note 11, at 395 (“There is no single model of 
a mental health court that is suitable to all communities.”). 
42. Mental Health Courts Primer, supra note 7, at 4 (emphasis added). 
43. Guide to Design and Implementation, supra note 16, at 47; Council 
of State Gov’ts Justice Center, Improving Responses to People 
With Mental Illnesses: The Essential Elements of a Mental 
Health Court 3 (2007); see, e.g., State Court Admin. Office, 
Michigan Supreme Court, Developing and Implementing a Mental 
Health Court in Michigan 8 (Aug. 2013); Missouri Thirteenth 
Judicial Circuit Court, Introduction to Mental Health  
Court 6, http://www.courts.mo.gov/hosted/circuit13/documents/ASC_ 
MCHPoliciesAndProceduresManual.pdf [https://perma.cc/5VVM-K9HG] 
(last visited Jan. 29, 2016); York Cty., York Cty. Mental Health 
Court Manual 4 (2005). 
44. Ursula Castellano & Leon Anderson, Mental Health Courts in America: 
Promises and Challenges, 57 Am. Behav. Scientist 163, 164 (2013). While 
these are the primary criteria considered by Mental Health Court referrers, 
the Bazelon Center for Mental Health Law suggests that an additional 
criterion should be whether other diversion routes are available because “the 
proper role [of Mental Health Courts] is to address the needs of those who 
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courts: some restrict eligibility to offenders charged with misdemeanors, 
many others restrict or extend eligibility to offenders charged with 
felonies, and others use additional restrictive criteria, like requiring that 
the charged crime be nonviolent.45 Likewise, there is no uniform diag-
nosis criterion.46 (Though many referrers and mental health courts use 
a pre-referral severe mental illness diagnosis—typically along the lines 
of schizophrenia, major depression, bipolar disorder, or other clinically 
significant mental conditions—as a proxy for determining whether the 
serious mental illness eligibility requirement is achieved.47) If the ref-
errer believes the offender fits the appropriate criteria, she files a referral 
form with the court for further processing.48 
Following referral, the mental health court screens the candidate to 
determine whether she is within the target population, gathers addit-
ional background information on the candidate, and makes a final 
 
cannot [otherwise] be diverted without arrest or at pre-booking or arraign-
ment, but for whom punishment through incarceration is not appropriate.” 
Judge David L. Bazelon Ctr. for Mental Health Law, The Role 
of Mental Health Courts in System Reform 5 (2004) [hereinafter 
Bazelon Ctr. on The Role of Mental Health Courts]. 
45. GAINS Center Database, supra note 12. Among reporting mental health 
courts, twenty-four percent restrict participation to charged misdemeanants, 
thirty percent restrict participation to charged felons, and forty-six percent 
permit participation by both charged misdemeanants and felons. Four percent 
of the courts allowing misdemeanant participation and thirty-six percent of 
the courts allowing felon participation require the charged misdemeanor or 
felony be non-violent. 
46. Cf. Castellano & Anderson, supra note 44, at 164 (discussing the variance 
in “treatment modalities” and other processes across mental health courts 
that may deal with different kind of “defendants, funding sources, and . . .  
political and cultural climate[s]”). 
47. Id. (discussing the use of the DSM-IV diagnoses). A DSM-IV Axis I diagnosis 
indicates a Clinical Mental Disorder. American Psychiatric Ass’n, 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual on Mental Disorders 28 (4th 
ed. 2000). This is defined as a “clinically significant behavior or psychological 
syndrome or pattern that occurs in an individual and that is associated with 
present distress . . . or disability, . . . [though n]either deviant behavior . . .  
nor conflicts that are primarily between the individual and society are mental 
disorders unless the deviance or conflict is a symptom of a dysfunction in 
the individual.” Id. at xxxi. Recently, the American Psychiatric Association 
has developed the DSM-V, and this has generally replaced the use of  
DSM-IV as a more accurate diagnostic tool. The difference here, however, 
is immaterial—whichever manual diagnoses are based on, it serves as the 
proxy for mental health court eligibility. For more information about DSM-
V, see American Psychiatric Ass’n, Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual on Mental Disorders (5th ed. 2013). 
48. See, e.g., Guide to Design and Implementation, supra note 16, at 89 
(providing a sample screening and referral form). 
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determination of eligibility.49 In addition to an evaluation regarding the 
requisite charge and diagnosis, mental health courts also evaluate the 
candidate for participation requirements, like legal competence,50 and 
may require a guilty plea.51 If the court determines that the eligibility 
requirements are fulfilled and the offender makes an informed, volun-
tary choice to participate, then he will become enrolled in the mental 
health court.52 
The next phase is split into two parts: staffing and status hearings. 
During staffing, the court team—the judge, defense attorney, pros-
ecutor, case manager, treatment provider, and other supervisory 
agents—discusses and defines the defendant’s compliance, goals, and 
treatment plan.53 The treatment plan often consists of several phases 
marked by interim treatment goals like abstinence from substance 
abuse, participation in designated therapy, and increased stability in 
housing and financial arrangements.54 One of the more striking features 
of staffing meetings in mental health courts is the changed roles for the 
court officers involved. Judges leave the formal, neutral adjudicator role 
and become deeply involved in planning, facilitating, and encouraging 
treatment.55 Prosecutors abandon advocacy for punishment and seek to 
forward treatment in the best interests of the defendant and the comm-
unity.56 Defense attorneys abandon advocacy for the least restrictive 
sentence and instead act as advisors to the court on how to attain 
treatment goals while protecting the rights of their clients. And treat-
ment professionals shift from not only providing care to also recommen-
 
49. Id. at 48–51. 
50. Id. at 43. Generally, a defendant is competent if she “can understand the 
legal situation and the proceedings and can also assist . . . her attorney in 
the defense.” Id. If determined incompetent, the court may order certain 
treatment or even civil commitment assessment. Faraci, supra note 14, at 
828–29. It is important to note that having a severe mental illness does 
not automatically render someone legally incompetent or insane. Slate 
et al., supra note 11, at 301. 
51. See Seltzer, supra note 14, at 576 (“[H]alf [of the Mental Health Courts 
studied by the Bazelon Center] required guilty or no-contest pleas as a 
condition of participation.”). See also Position Statement 53: Mental Health 
Courts, supra note 8 (opposing guilty pleas as a requirement for participation 
in Mental Health Courts). 
52. Guide to Design and Implementation, supra note 16, at 43. 
53. Mental Health Courts Primer, supra note 7, at 7; see also, Guide to 
Design and Implementation, supra note 16, at 56, 61. 
54. See, e.g., York Cty., supra note 43, at 14–17 (dividing the treatment plan 
into three six-month phases). 
55. Slate et al., supra note 11, at 388–91. 
56. Id. 
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ding to the court whether advancement, rewards, or sanctions are app-
ropriate.57 Most importantly, though, the participant is excluded from 
these staffing meetings. 
Following staffing, the court brings in the participant and conducts 
nonadversarial status hearings to monitor participants’ compliance with 
the plan and other participation requirements, to reward those who are 
compliant, and to sanction those who are noncompliant.58 Through 
these hearings, the court informs participants of the treatment plan and 
goals for the period before the next status hearing. Although partici-
pants may be allowed to speak during these hearings, the plans and 
goals are mandates created in the staffing meeting, and participants’ 
input during status hearings has little influence on them.59 
The final step in the mental health court process is termination. If 
the participant satisfactorily completes the phases of the program, she 
moves on to graduation; however, if noncompliant, she will either con-
tinue participation until the phases are completed or be removed from 
the program either by herself or the mental health court.60 Graduation 
from the program often means that the charges against the participant 
are dismissed or, if the court required a guilty plea for enrollment, that 
the plea is dismissed or expunged.61 Expulsion or withdrawal, on the 
other hand, typically results in the former participant being processed 
through traditional court mechanisms, which can have important conse-
quences like the use of information revealed in staffing and status 
hearings or automatic conviction if the court required a guilty plea for 
participation.62 
 
57. Id. at 390–91. 
58. Mental Health Courts Primer, supra note 7, at 7. 
59. Author’s Observations from the Juvenile Mental Health Court, Cuyahoga 
County on February 9, 2015. Though processes in juvenile court and adult 
court often differ, the staffing meetings and status hearings are present in 
both juvenile and adult mental health courts. See, e.g., State Court 
Admin. Office, Michigan Supreme Court, supra note 43, at 12 
(discussing staffing meetings and status hearing reviews in the Michigan 
mental health court system). 
60. Guide to Design and Implementation, supra note 16, at 73–76. 
61. Bazelon Ctr. for Mental Health Law, supra note 44, at 8–10. While 
over a third of the programs dismiss or expunge charges automatically, many 
require the participant to request the dismissal or expungement, which can 
take a substantial amount of time, during which the danger of relapse is 
high due to complications in finding employment and housing with a 
conviction record. Id. Because of this issue, the Bazelon Center recommends 
that, where courts do require guilty pleas, those pleas be automatically 
dismissed upon graduation. Id. at 9. 
62. Seltzer, supra note 14, at 575 (noting that about half of the courts permitted 
withdrawal without prejudice within certain time restrictions, but most 
put no restrictions on prosecutors’ use of information obtained through 
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Since participation in these processes has important implications 
for participants’ rights, all mental health courts include in their part-
icipation criteria the requirement that enrollment be voluntary. The 
next section, and the remainder of this Note, is devoted to the volun-
tariness criterion and the consumer-participation model’s effect on it. 
II. Barriers to Voluntariness in Mental Health  
Court Participation 
Despite the importance of voluntariness, significant barriers to 
reaching it exist in the mental health court context. These barriers can 
be split into two categories: first, some voluntariness problems may 
arise due to participants’ diminished capacities stemming from their 
mental illness; and, second, some structural issues also create road-
blocks to voluntariness. This section discusses these barriers, finding 
that a lack of voluntariness is not due to any immutable traits in mental 
health patients, but is rooted in the current structure of mental health 
courts. This structure, however, can be manipulated to improve 
voluntariness. 
A. Mental Health Court Participants’ Diminished  
Capacities for Voluntariness 
Serious concerns arise as to mental health court participants’ 
capacity to make voluntary decisions to participate as a result of their 
clinical diagnoses—serious mental illnesses like schizophrenia, major de-
pression, and bipolar disorder. One of the concerns is participants’ 
reduced decisional capacity. People with schizophrenia, for example, are 
by definition afflicted with distorted perception and thought, character-
istics vital to the decision-making process.63 Several studies have shown 
that there is a correlation between schizophrenia and diminished 
decision-making capacity, especially in regard to appreciation (under-
standing conditions and consequences).64 The results of similar studies  
the defendant’s participation). The problems associated with guilty pleas 
in graduation, withdrawal, and expulsion have led advocacy groups to 
oppose the guilty plea as a requirement for enrollment. See, e.g., Position 
Statement 53: Mental Health Courts, supra note 8; Bazelon Ctr. for 
Mental Health Law, supra note 44, at 8–9. 
63. See William T. Carpenter et al., Decisional Capacity for Informed Consent in 
Schizophrenia Research, 57 Archives of Gen. Psychiatry 533, 533 (2000). 
64. See, e.g., Paul S. Appelbaum, Decisional Capacity of Patients with 
Schizophrenia to Consent to Research: Taking Stock, 32 Schizophrenia 
Bull. 22, 22–23 (2006) (noting that a study has shown that people with 
schizophrenia scored significantly worse on measures of understanding and 
appreciation but not on reasoning or choice and concluding that a diagnosis 
of schizophrenia does not per se indicate that a patient cannot competently 
consent to research participation); Jeffrey A. Kovnick et al., Competence to 
Consent to Research Among Long-Stay Inpatients with Chronic Schizophrenia, 
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seem to indicate that people with severe depression also have impaired 
decisional capacity.65 Further, even if a person with a severe mental 
illness makes the decision to participate, this decision many not equate 
to an ability to voluntarily carry out that decision.66 
While these studies suggest that mental health courts’ target 
participants may be less able to voluntarily participate due to dimin-
ished capacities for decision-making or voluntarism, this is not to say 
that mental health court participants are necessarily incapable of 
voluntary participation. First, people with severe mental illnesses gen-
erally have a range of cognitive and functional characteristics, allowing 
many the ability to make decisions on a “normal” level.67 Second, many 
of the deficiencies in decisional capacity may potentially be overcome 
through adherence to medication regimens and education.68 The edu-
cation that may be necessary for mental health court participants to 
make a truly voluntary decision to participate touches upon the next 
subsection’s topic: the structural barriers to voluntary participation in 
mental health courts. 
B. Structural Barriers to Voluntary Participation 
As discussed above, education may improve mental health court 
participants’ decision-making and voluntariness capacities. Still, many 
 
54 Psychiatric Servs. 1247, 1247 (2003), http://ps.psychiatryonline.org/ 
doi/full/10.1176/appi.ps.54.9.1247 [https://perma.cc/SB3C-2FBD] (finding 
a negative correlation between degree of illness and decisional capacity in 
patients with schizophrenia); Carpenter, supra note 63, at 537. But see 
Dilip V. Jeste et al., Magnitude of Impairment in Decisional Capacity in 
People with Schizophrenia Compared to Normal Subjects: An Overview, 32 
Schizophrenia Bull. 121, 126 (2006) (finding that, in four examined studies, 
“a majority of people with schizophrenia was deemed to have adequate 
decision-making capacity”). “Appreciation” is the ability to understand the 
“effects of . . . participation (or failure to participate) on subjects’ own 
situations,” Paul S. Appelbaum et al., Competence of Depressed Patients for 
Consent to Research, 156 Am. J. of Psychiatry 1380, 1381 (1999), and/or 
the ability to understand one’s own condition, Jeste et al., supra, at 121. 
65. See, e.g., Appelbaum et al., supra note 64, at 1381 (noting that the frequency 
of such impairment and its relation to the degree of depression present 
remain unclear). 
66. See Laura Weiss Roberts, Informed Consent and the Capacity for 
Voluntarism, 159 Am. J. Psychiatry 705, 705 (2002) (distinguishing the 
diminished capacity for voluntarism as from decisional capacity). 
67. See Jeste et al., supra note 64, at 126–27 (“Persons with schizophrenia 
may be generally at risk for impaired decision-making capacity, yet such 
impairment is not invariable.”). 
68. See Appelbaum, supra note 64, at 23 (noting that “educational intervention” 
helped bring patients with schizophrenia “who scored poorly on under-
standing into the range of performance of the comparison group”). 
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mental health courts have built-in structural barriers to educating part-
icipants regarding the processes and consequences of participation: 
complexity caused by the changed roles of court officers and the ex-
clusion of participants from treatment-planning. 
While participants may find much of the information regarding 
mental health court processes in their participation manuals,69 it is 
incumbent upon defense counsel to explain this information to their 
clients to help them determine whether mental health court part-
icipation is the most appropriate option.70 Several studies have shown, 
however, that many mental health court participants are not even 
aware that participation is optional, much less aware of its conse-
quences.71 Some scholars blame this lack of understanding on the courts’ 
cursory inquiry into participants’ actual voluntariness;72 however, it 
may be more deeply rooted in the complexity faced by defense attor-
neys. In the mental health court context, the defense attorney may be 
uncomfortable shifting her concern from solely the patient’s rights to 
considering factors outside the normal criminal case, such as clinical 
options for treatment and medication.73 Still, this shortcoming can be 
mitigated through the court requiring more explicit statements regard-
ing participant choice, increased mental health training for the court 
 
69. See, e.g., Merrimack Cty/6th Circuit–Dist. Div.–Concord, Mental 
Health Court Participant Manual (2011) (detailing mental health 
court procedures). 
70. Guide to Design and Implementation, supra note 16, at 44. 
71. See Allison D. Redlich, Voluntary, but Knowing and Intelligent? 
Comprehension in Mental Health Courts, 11 Psychol. Pub. Pol’y & L. 
605, 610 (2005) (finding participants unaware of the voluntary nature of 
mental health court participation in one mental health court); Norman G. 
Poythress et al., Perceived Coercion and Procedural Justice in the Broward 
Mental Health Court, 25 Int’l J.L. & Psychiatry 517, 530 (2002) (noting 
that “a number of defendants reported that they were unaware that they 
had a choice regarding their participation in the [mental health] court.”); 
see also Alison D. Redlich & Alicia Summers, Voluntary, Knowing, and 
Intelligent Pleas: Understanding the Plea Inquiry, 18 Psychol. Pub. Pol’y 
& L. 626, 639 (2012) (finding that, though mental health court participants 
understood that their plea was voluntary, the majority of participants 
understood only sixty percent of the terms and consequences of that plea). 
72. See Poythress et al., supra note 71, at 530 (noting that, though the court 
sometimes elicits explicit statements of assent from the defendant, many 
times the court’s determination of consent is more implicit). 
73. See Seltzer, supra note 14, at 574 (noting that the complexities of mental 
health courts may “undermine the defense attorney’s ability to assess the 
prosecutor’s case and, thus, his or her ability to properly advise the client); 
see also Slate et al, supra note 11, at 390–91 (“Defense attorneys are 
often resistant to diversion, particularly for misdemeanors, because more 
extensive probation may expose their clients to longer periods under control 
of the criminal justice system.”). 
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team, and other adjustments improving the dissemination of inform-
ation to participants.74 
Moreover, one of the most important processes in the mental health 
court is conducted without participant input: determining the course of 
treatment and goals. As discussed earlier in this Note, the court team 
plans treatment and goals for the participant during the staffing 
meeting, at which only the court team is present.75 This closed-doors 
planning not only excludes the participant from making important clin-
ical decisions, but also inhibits the dissemination of important inform-
ation, such as the motivations behind the planning decisions and goals. 
Further, these decisions are handed down to the participant as mand-
ates regardless of whether the participant voices disagreement or con-
cern about her ability to comply.76 Since this lack of inclusion avoids a 
real dialogue between the court and the participant, the court misses 
an opportunity to educate and empower the participant to fully under-
stand the decision to comply. Further, since noncompliance is met with 
drastic consequences—expulsion for noncompliance, for example, may 
carry with it conviction if a guilty plea is required for enrollment77—
participants’ inability to shape these treatment decisions results in a 
heightened degree of coercion. Here, excluding participants from treat-
ment planning results in both coercion and a lack of understanding, 
negating voluntariness.78 
These structural barriers to information dissemination and partici-
pation inhibit the education necessary for mental health court part-
icipants to overcome their diminished capacities for voluntarily deciding 
to participate. Still, these structural barriers can be manipulated to 
increase voluntarism in mental health court participation and alleviate 
 
74. See Poythress et al., supra note 71, at 530 (noting that “making explicit 
to defendants that they have a choice whether to remain in [the mental 
health court] may further reduce perceived coercion”); Seltzer, supra note 
14, at 576 (recommending that defense attorneys have “at their disposal 
trained clinicians” to assist in making sure clients are properly informed). 
75. See supra Part I.B. 
76. See supra Part I.B. 
77. Guilty pleas are required by approximately half of Mental Health Courts. 
Bazelon Ctr. on The Role of Mental Health Courts, supra note 
44, at 8; see Patricia A. Griffin et al., The Use of Criminal Charges and 
Sanctions in Mental Health Courts, 53 Psychiatric Servs. 1285, 1286 
(2002), http://ps.psychiatryonline.org/doi/full/10.1176/appi.ps.53.10.1285 
[https://perma.cc/4BQR-R5VD] (noting specific courts that require guilty 
pleas for access to Mental Health Courts); see also Guide to Design and 
Implementation, supra note 16, at 38 (citing Council of State Gov’ts, 
Mental Health Courts Program 2 (2003)) (Roughly forty percent of 
the Mental Health Courts studied required a guilty plea by all participants, 
while slightly more required a guilty plea from at least some participants.). 
78. Voluntary participation requires a lack of coercion and an understanding 
of the decision and its consequences. See supra Introduction. 
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some of the legal concerns raised by mental health court opponents. 
The next section considers the consumer-participation model, the im-
plementation of which would allow for the increased dissemination of 
information necessary for voluntary participation. 
III. The Consumer-Participation Model for  
Mental Health Courts 
If the main obstacle for voluntariness is the insufficiency of inform-
ation necessary for defendants to voluntarily participate, the solution 
must be a system change capable of disseminating this vital inform-
ation. One method for ensuring that information is available to mental 
health court participants is taking the treatment and goals planning 
process out from behind closed doors to include the participant: the 
consumer-participation model. This section proposes that mental health 
courts will benefit by incorporating the consumer-participation model 
for clinical mental health treatment. Adopting this model will improve 
the level of voluntariness through participants’ access to information 
and, in doing so, address many of the legal concerns that mental health 
court opponents field. 
A. The Consumer-Participation Model and Improved  
Access to Information 
Consumer-participation models for mental health services emerged 
in the 1970s, when activists reacted against the marginalization of 
mental health patients in clinical settings and advocated for an increas-
ed level of control and responsibility for the patient over her own life.79 
Scholars have identified three types of consumer-participation models: 
(1) individual discussion and engagement as part of the decision-making 
process, (2) participation on the organizational level, and (3) active 
involvement with the community’s planning and policy decision-
making.80 This Note recommends that mental health courts adopt the 
first type, which emphasizes individual choice and exposes individuals 
to a range of information and opportunities for treatment.81 
Hickey & Kipping call the individual level consumer-participation 
model “user involvement” and identify four levels on the continuum of 
 
79. Nora Jacobson & Laurie Curtis, Recovery as Policy in Mental Health 
Services: Strategies Emerging from the States, 23 Psychiatric Rehab. J. 
333, 333–34 (2000). 
80. Margaret Tobin et al., Consumer Participation in Mental Health Services: 
Who Wants It and Why?, 25 Australian Health Rev. 91, 92 (2002). 
81. Jacobson & Curtis, supra note 79, at 335. 
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participation.82 The base level is information/explanation, in which the 
individual is given a higher degree of information regarding the motiv-
ations behind the decisions but has no decisional authority.83 The 
second level is consultation, in which the decision-makers gather input 
from the participant but still retain all the decisional authority.84 The 
third level, partnership, would go a step further and split decisional 
authority equally between the treatment supervisors and the part-
icipant.85 Finally, the fourth level gives the ultimate decisional authority 
regarding treatment to the participant.86 
Mental health courts ought to adopt something between the 
consultation and partnership levels. The first two levels—information/ 
explanation and consultation—would only slightly improve the level of 
participation and do little to negate mental health courts’ coercive 
elements because there would be no shift in decisional authority. On 
the other hand, the partnership and user-control levels create too great 
a power-shift and would undermine the court’s authority, inviting 
increased criticism from retributivists. Instead, a middle level of user 
involvement, a gradual increase in limited deference to participant 
choice with the court team retaining the ultimate choice, is appropriate. 
This mid-level approach would avoid the court genuflecting to part-
icipants’ will while still allowing participants to assent or dissent to the 
proposed treatment plan.87 Further, it would allow for adjustments as 
participants’ decisional-capacity increases through participation. 
Adopting this mid-level of the user involvement consumer-partici-
pation model would increase the level of voluntariness in mental health 
courts through increased information and reduced coercion. The access 
to information would be improved almost as a matter of course because, 
instead of being shut out of the treatment planning process,88 the 
participant would become an integral part of that process. As a part of 
that process, the participant would become privy to the discussions and 
 
82. Gary Hickey & Cheryl Kipping, Exploring the Concept of User Involvement 
in Mental Health Through a Participation Continuum, 7 J. Clinical 
Nursing 83, 84–85 (1998). 
83. Id. at 85. 
84. Id. 
85. Id. 
86. Id. 
87. See Fred C. Osher & Iren S. Levine, Bureau of Justice Assistance, 
Navigating the Mental Health Maze: A Guide for Court Pract-
itioners 18 (2005) (“Full consumer approval in the court process is not 
warranted, but soliciting defendant input and offering choices among 
treatment options can improve both short-term compliance and long-
term outcomes.”). 
88. See supra Part I.B. 
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motivations behind certain treatment proposals as well as different 
options for which she could voice her preference. On the other hand, 
coercion would decrease because, instead of allowing “defense counsel 
and/or the court [to] make decisions . . . [even though the participant] 
is thoroughly confused and afraid,”89 the court team would be forced to 
help alleviate participant confusion and consider a participant’s input. 
Since improving voluntariness requires a reduction in coercion and an 
improvement in understanding,90 adopting this mid-level model of the 
user involvement consumer-participation model would improve the 
level of voluntariness in mental health court participation. 
This manipulation to the structural barriers to voluntary part-
icipation would also help reduce the clinical barriers to voluntary 
participation. As discussed above, the key clinical barrier to voluntary 
participation is mental health court participants’ diminished decisional 
and voluntarism capacities.91 Not only will the structural change caused 
by adopting the consumer-participation model allow opportunities for 
education regarding the decision to participate,92 but also the empower-
ment that participants experience through increasing their involvement 
will have its own benefits. One of the problems causing participants’ 
diminished capacities is that people with severe mental illnesses are 
often “conditioned to be compliant and often come to believe they are 
powerless.”93 Combating both perceived and actual powerlessness thr-
ough increasing choice and control helps mental health patients develop 
stronger decision-making and cognitive abilities, including realizing and 
achieving personal goals.94 Further, empowerment helps participants 
recognize their self-worth, which is necessary to confront the stigmati-
zation of mental illness, a factor contributing to decompensation.95 
Through empowerment, the use of the consumer-participation model in 
mental health courts will help overcome the barriers to voluntary  
89. Faraci, supra note 14, at 846–47. 
90. See supra Introduction. 
91. See supra Part II.A. 
92. See supra Part III.A. 
93. Geoffrey Nelson et al., Empowerment and Mental Health in Community: 
Narratives of Psychiatric Consumer/Survivors, 11 J. Community & 
Applied Soc. Psychol. 125, 126 (2001). 
94. See id. at 126–27. 
95. See E. Sally Rogers et al., A Consumer-Constructed Scale to Measure 
Empowerment Among Users of Mental Health Services, 48 Psychiatric 
Servs. 1042, 1043 (1997) (discussing methods for measuring empowerment); 
Improving Outcomes, supra note 5, at 16 (noting probationers with mental 
illness perceived themselves as “needy and time-consuming,” reflecting a low 
self-worth). Decompensation is the “failure of defense mechanisms such as 
occurs in initial and subsequent episodes of acute mental illness.” Taber’s 
Cyclopedic Medical Dictionary 586 (Donald Venes ed., 21st ed. 2009). 
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participation caused by participant’s diminished capacities for decision-
making and voluntarism. 
Since the beginning level of involvement is unaffected by consumer-
participation and its benefits are not realized until after enrollment, 
adopting this model may open the door for opponents to argue that this 
model would not improve voluntariness at the enrollment stage. Indeed, 
many opponents and supporters have recognized that true voluntariness 
is unlikely at the early stages and advocate for one important safeguard: 
the right to withdraw without prejudice.96 This right allows for part-
icipants to reach back in time and elect a traditional adjudicatory path 
(with all its constitutional safeguards) if they find that they cannot 
comply with or fully participate in the mental health court.97 This Note 
supports a more widespread adoption of this withdrawal right;98 how-
ever, the right to withdraw’s potential cannot be realized without giving 
participants greater education on its existence and consequences and 
empowering them to invoke it. In this manner, the right to withdraw is 
enhanced by adopting the consumer-participation model because it 
would help ensure that the decision to invoke or to not invoke the right 
is made with an improved level of information and decision-making 
capacity.99 
The consumer-participation model focuses on two of the keys to 
improving decision-making and voluntariness capacities in people with 
mental illnesses: education and empowerment.100 Since the adoption of 
a consumer-participation model using mid-level user involvement would 
help improve the dissemination of information, reduce coercion, and 
empower participants to make choices regarding their treatment and 
participation, the adoption of this model would help improve partici-
pants’ capacities for voluntariness in mental health courts. 
 
96. See Seltzer, supra note 14, at 575 (discussing the importance of the right to 
withdraw from mental health court participation); Position Statement 53: 
Mental Health Courts, supra note 8 (noting that voluntary participation is 
key aspect of mental health courts). 
97. Seltzer, supra note 14, at 575. 
98. Only roughly half of the reporting mental health courts included the right 
to withdraw. Id. 
99. There still may be other barriers to invoking the right to withdraw, such 
as time limits or plea requirements, but a full discussion on these barriers 
is outside the scope of this paper. I agree with Seltzer and the MHA that 
these barriers should be lifted. See id. (discussing the importance of the 
right to withdraw); Position Statement 53: Mental Health Courts, supra 
note 8 (noting ways to avoid coercion in mental health courts). 
100. See supra Part II.A. (citing Paul S. Appelbaum, Decisional Capacity of 
Patients with Schizophrenia to Consent to Research: Taking Stock, 32 
Schizophrenia Bull. 22, 23 (2006)). 
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Still, even if voluntarism is improved, the adoption of the consumer-
participation model would be of little use if opponents are able to 
succeed in dismantling the mental health court system by arguing that 
it trammels participants’ rights. The next subsection will address how 
improving the level of voluntariness will affect these mental health court 
opponents’ legal arguments. 
B. Consumer-Participation’s Effect on Opponents’ Legal and Practical 
Arguments Against Mental Health Courts 
While increasing mental health courts’ level of voluntary partici-
pation through adopting the consumer-participation model has its own 
benefits to the legitimacy of mental health courts, it has the added 
benefit of addressing many of the legal and practical issues that oppo-
nents raise.101 As discussed above, adopting the consumer-participation 
model will allow for a greater flow of information because it facilitates 
a higher level of communication between court teams and participants, 
who are no longer locked outside the court’s planning. This heightened 
communication will help ensure that participants have access to the 
resources necessary to understand their rights, waivers, and the conse-
quences of their decisions. 
1. Constitutional Issues 
Many opponents suggest that mental health court participation 
conflicts with defendants’ constitutional rights, namely the right to a 
jury and the right to counsel.102 While participation likely does impact 
these rights, adopting the consumer-participation model will help avoid 
violations because it will help ensure that participants are informed in 
waiving them. 
First, mental health courts using the consumer-participation model 
may improve the capacity for participants to understand and waive 
their jury trial right. Opponents argue that mental health court partici-
pation conflicts with the right to a jury trial,103 which is especially  
101. The legal issues discussed in this Note are concerned with federal 
constitutional standards and federal statutes applicable to the states, though 
state standards may also apply to Mental Health Courts. 
102. Seltzer, supra note 14, at 574. Opponents often also raise concerns regarding 
equal protection. Id. However, the equal protection argument would likely fall 
on rational basis scrutiny because improving rehabilitation and reducing 
adverse prison populations is likely a legitimate state interest. See generally 
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (limiting the courts’ 
inquiry into laws affecting mentally disabled persons to rational basis “with 
bite” scrutiny). 
103. Faraci, supra note 14, at 839; see, e.g., Cty. of Skagit, Sup. Ct. of Wash., 
Agreement, Waiver and Statement of Defendant on Submittal or Stipulation 
of Facts and Order to Participate in Mental Health Court, http://www. 
skagitcounty.net/SuperiorCourt/Documents/MHC/Stipulation%20and%
20Order%20to%20Participate%20in%20MHC.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
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important where the participant is charged with a serious crime, such 
as a high misdemeanor or a felony.104 This right, established by the 
Sixth Amendment and extended to the states by the Fourteenth 
Amendment,105 provides that “the accused shall enjoy the right to a 
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury.”106 Still, it may be waived 
under certain circumstances,107 and courts have ruled that this waiver 
must be “voluntary, knowing, and intelligent.”108 In other words, the 
defendant must have access to enough information and understanding 
regarding this right, and his waiver must be free of coercion.109 
Assuming that mental health courts implement the right to with-
draw without prejudice as briefly discussed above,110 adopting the 
consumer-participation model would help ensure that participants have 
greater access to the court team, thereby increasing their access to 
information regarding the jury trial right. Here, since not exercising the 
right to withdraw would be almost a continuous waiver of that right, 
the increased access to information resources through improved involve-
ment and communication would help participants make these contin-
uous waivers with greater understanding. 
Similarly, mental health courts using the consumer-participation 
model may improve the capacity for participants to waive conflicts with 
their right to counsel. While mental health courts do not require partici-
pants to abandon this right,111 problems may arise due to the different 
role the defense attorney must take on as a contributing member of a 
 
Y66Q-8NR6] (requiring the waiver of a jury trial right as part of the enrollment 
form). 
104. See Lewis v. United States, 518 U.S. 322, 324 (1996) (ruling that there is no 
Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial for some lesser offenses). 
105. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 341 (1963). 
106. U.S. Const. amend. VI. 
107. See Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 26 (1965) (recognizing that 
limitations, such as requiring the waiver to be in writing, are permissible 
because “the ability to waive a jury trial [is not] of equal importance to 
the right to demand one”). 
108. Spytma v. Howes, 313 F.3d 363, 370 (6th Cir. 2002). This requirement is 
consistent with the Supreme Court’s requirements for waiving other rights 
of the accused. See, e.g., Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421 (1986) 
(ruling that the waiver of Miranda rights must be “voluntary in the sense 
that it was . . . a free and deliberate choice . . . [and] made with a full 
awareness of . . . the right being abandoned and the consequences”). 
109. Spytma, 313 F.3d at 370. 
110. See supra Part III.A. 
111. See Seltzer, supra note 14, at 574 (noting that defense attorneys perform 
a crucial role in Mental Health Courts by informing participants of the 
consequences of participation and their options). 
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non-adversarial treatment team.112 While some scholars have classified 
this altered role as creating a “competing set of loyalties” giving rise to 
a conflict of interest,113 it seems unlikely that an actual conflict of 
interest arises because this altered role neither changes the defense 
attorney’s pecuniary interests nor diverts his attention from the best 
interests of his client.114 Instead, the mental health court defense 
attorney simply must work to achieve what is best for his client in 
cooperation with the other members of the team, rather than advocate 
for what would be considered the “best deal” in more traditional sett-
ings.115 This represents more of a shift in the defendant’s interests rather 
than the creation of conflicting interests for the defense attorney. 
The more likely danger inherent in defense attorneys’ shifting roles 
is to the attorney-client privilege.116 Though this privilege is not itself a 
constitutional doctrine,117 it is part and parcel to the execution of the 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel.118 Since defense attorneys may need 
to reveal potentially privileged information that could be used against 
participants who withdraw and return to the traditional process, it is 
imperative that they reveal this risk as part of the duty to ensure that 
their clients understand the possible consequences of participation.119 
As discussed above, the participant in the consumer-participation mod-
el would have access to the discussions in which these revelations are 
normally made, so using this model will help attorneys “manage [the] 
 
112. Faraci, supra note 14, at 844. 
113. Id. (quoting Richard C. Boldt, Rehabilitative Punishment and the Drug 
Treatment Court Movement, 76 Wash. U. L.Q. 1205, 1213 (1998)). 
114. The standard here is that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel carries with 
it “a correlative right to representation that is free from conflicts of interest,” 
Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261, 271 (1981), which is violated when “the 
attorney could have pursued a plausible alternative [to a problematic course 
of action, but it was] not undertaken due to the attorney’s other interests or 
loyalties.” Bucuvalas v. United States, 98 F.3d 652, 656 (1st Cir. 1996). 
115. Christin E. Keele, Note, Criminalization of the Mentally Ill: The Challenging 
Role of the Defense Attorney in the Mental Health Court System, 71 U. 
Mo. Kan. City L. Rev. 193, 206 (2002). 
116. See Roger C. Park et al., Evidence Law: A Student’s Guide to 
the Law of Evidence as Applied in American Trials 439 (3d ed. 2011) 
(noting that most states have adopted this privilege either by statute or in 
common law). 
117. Maness v. Meyers, 419 U.S. 449, 466 n.15 (1975). 
118. See Michael B. Dashjian, People v. Meredith: The Attorney-Client Privilege 
and the Criminal Defendant’s Constitutional Rights, 70 Calif. L. Rev. 
1048, 1050 (1982) (noting that the attorney-client privilege is an essential 
part of protecting defendants’ fifth and sixth amendment rights). 
119. Seltzer, supra note 14, at 574. 
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clash of expectations and responsibilities” through the participant’s own 
observations and increased access to information.120 
Because adopting the consumer-participation model for the mental 
health court setting would result in an increased flow of information 
and inclusion in the processes, it is likely that participants would have 
a better understanding and ability to exercise or waive their rights to 
a jury trial and the attorney-client privilege. 
2. The Americans with Disabilities Act 
In addition to the constitutional issues, opponents suggest that 
mental health court participation may violate Title II of the Americans 
with Disabilities Act’s (ADA) “prohibition against discrimination by a 
state program.”121 This prohibition provides that: “[N]o qualified indivi-
dual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded 
from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, 
or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any 
such entity.”122 
Under this prohibition, states cannot require defendants to 
completely abdicate their access to the traditional court system.123 Here, 
participants’ understanding that they can withdraw from the mental 
health court system to return the traditional court system plays a vital 
role in protecting this access.124 This remains true even if mental health 
courts are couched as an accommodation under the ADA, as some scho-
lars have suggested.125 This is because states cannot use their duty to 
accommodate as an excuse for “fail[ing] to provide individuals with a 
meaningful right of access to the courts.”126 This access, however, may 
 
120.  Faraci, supra note 14, at 844. 
121. Seltzer, supra note 14, at 574. 
122. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 § 202, 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2012). 
123. See Ronda Cress et al., Mental Health Courts and Title II of the ADA: 
Accessibility to State Court Systems for Individuals with Mental Disabilities 
and the Need for Diversion, 25 St. Louis U. Pub. L. Rev. 307, 345 (2006) 
(“[A] public entity, such as a state’s judicial system, cannot require an 
individual with a mental disability to accept diversion into a mental health 
court if he or she wants to participate in the mainstream state courts . . . .”). 
124. Id. at 343 (arguing that “so long as individuals who are diverted into 
[mental health courts] still have the option to participate in the ‘regular’ 
court system,” mental health courts can “pass muster under the ADA”). 
125. Id. at 347 (“[M]ental [H]ealth [C]ourts are arguably necessary to bring the 
state[s’] court system[s] into compliance with the ADA.”). 
126. Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 533 (2004). See also Dept. of Justice, 
The Americans with Disabilities Act: Title VII Technical 
Assistance Manual II-3.4300 (1993), http://www.ada.gov/taman2.html 
[https://perma.cc/MN34-BRNJ] (suggesting that defendants “may not be 
required to accept [participation] if they choose not to do so”). 
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be hindered if participants lack the knowledge necessary to understand 
their ability to elect traditional court processing.127 The increased access 
to information and the improved decisional capacities created through 
adopting the consumer-participation model will help ensure that partic-
ipation comes without denying access to traditional court process, im-
proving compliance with the ADA.128 
3. Informed Consent 
Finally, incorporating the consumer-participation model for treat-
ment planning in mental health courts may avoid conflicts with the 
doctrine of informed consent. This doctrine requires that patients 
choose their treatment with an “understanding of alternatives to and 
risks of the therapy.”129 The fulfillment of this standard is tripartite: (1) 
the participant is informed, (2) the participant understands, and (3) 
the participant voluntarily consents to the treatment.130 
Although mental health courts may be able to forgo informed 
consent by asserting the exception available when a valid court order 
authorizes treatment,131 adopting the consumer-participation model 
may be a less polemical approach. 
As discussed above, the consumer-participation model will help ach-
ieve the information element of informed consent. As user involvement 
in discussion and decision-making increases, participants are exposed to 
a higher degree of information regarding the motivations behind and 
potential consequences of treatment.132 
Additionally, the consumer-participation model will help achieve 
the understanding element through an increase in participants’ cog-
nitive abilities. As discussed above, one of the key factors in increasing 
the understanding of people with mental illnesses is improving edu-
 
127. See Allison D. Redlich et al., Enrollment in Mental Health Courts: 
Voluntariness, Knowingness, and Adjudicative Competence, 34 Law & 
Hum. Behav. 91, 92 (2010) (“[C]lients who claimed not to know they had 
a choice in enrolling [and withdrawing] had significantly higher perceived 
coercion scores than those claiming to be aware.”). 
128. Compare supra Part III.A. (discussing the improved access to information 
and decisional capacities created through the consumer-participation 
model), with Redlich et al., supra note 127, at 93 (suggesting that mentally 
ill offenders are “known to have deficits in legal comprehension” and are 
“under significant stress and instability,” such that they will have trouble 
making a knowing and intelligent decision). 
129. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 780 n.15 (D.C. Cir. 1972). 
130. See Berg et al., supra note 17, at 65 (discussing the components of the 
informed consent). 
131. Id. at 90–91. 
132. Supra Part III.A. 
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cation. Therefore, the increased education that participants gain thro-
ugh the consumer-participation model will help increase their ability to 
understand the information they receive and decisions they make. 
Finally, it will improve the chances that participants will voluntar-
ily consent to treatment to meet the third prong of informed consent. 
First, the consumer-participation model’s improvement of information 
dissemination will help participants gain the education necessary for 
enhanced voluntarism. Second, rather than allowing the court to simply 
issue orders declaring the treatment that participants must comply 
with, participants will be able to articulate their points of view and 
affect treatment decisions. Coupling both enhancement of voluntarism 
capacities and allowing participants to use those enhanced capacities 
by articulating their own views will help empower participants to 
voluntarily consent to treatment in mental health courts. 
Since the heightened involvement and access to information resour-
ces involved in implementing the consumer-participation model will 
help address mental health court opponents’ legal concerns, adopting 
the consumer-participation model has an additional layer of attraction 
beyond just improving the level of voluntariness in participation. 
Conclusion 
Although mental health courts have been generally successful in 
improving the disproportionate incarceration and over-punishment of 
mentally ill offenders, their status as voluntary diversion programs has 
come under opponents’ criticism. Adopting a consumer-participation 
model to bring treatment-planning out from behind closed doors by 
involving participants will help improve participants’ access to inform-
ation and understanding and reduce the coerciveness of treatment man-
dates. Further, since this increased involvement will facilitate greater 
communication between mental health court participants and the court 
team, the consumer-participation model will help address many other 
arguments that opponents have fielded. Although a full realization of 
the consumer-participation model’s benefits may hinge on the co-
availability of a right to withdraw (a full discussion of which was out-
side the purview of this Note), it is nonetheless an important opportun-
ity for improving the structural and clinical barriers to voluntariness in 
mental health court participation. 
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